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The population of the United States is highly mobile, with about 3
pertent of the population moving atross state lines in any given year, and
almost 10 pertent of the population changing states over a five-year period
(15, p. 51]. As fertility rates remain at low levels following the baby
boom, internal migration has become an increasingly important source of
regional demographic change and a major determinant of concurrent shifts in
regional economic growth.
The theoretical and empirical study of internal migration has a long
hiatory in economics [10,113. Guided by the income-maximizing models of
Hicks [14] and Sjaaatad (23], early empirical research focused on explaining
the size and direction of migration flows, as well as determining why
certain groups of individuals, such as the highly educated, are more likely
to migrate than others (5,9,22]. Later work fruitfully emphasized the role
of the family in migration decisions [6,17]. However, despite this
extensive early literature and the central role played by internal migration
in the operation of a competitive economy, we believe it is fair to conclude
that the study of internal migration has not been at the forefront of
research in mainatream labor economics over the past decade.1
This recent disinterest is not symptomatic of a more general
indifference to the study of geographic mobility. By contrast, the analysis
of international migration has flourished in recent years [1,4] The
immigration literature suggests that embedding the Hicks-Sjaastad income-
maximizing approach within Roy's (213 self-selection model generates
important new insights [3].
2The current paper presents an application of this more general approach
to the analysis of internal migration flows within the United States. We
argue that the Hicks-Sjaastad framework is too restrictive for studying
internal migration. Ira key predictions are that persons migrate from low-
income regions to high-income regions and that increases in mobility costs
deter migration. In turn, these predictions focus empirical work almost
exclusively on the size and direction of population flows across regions.
Although the data generally support these predictions, there are many other
interesting and important questions left unaddressed.
The Hicks-Sjaastad model emphasizes the fact that mean income levels
differ across regions, and these income differentials (net of migration
costs) generate unidirectional migration flows. Conversely, the theoretical
approach suggested by the Roy model stresses regional differences in the
returns to skills (as well as regional differences in mean income) .These
skill-prite differentials determine the skill composition of migration
flows. Regions that pay higher returns to skills attract more skilled
workers than regions that pay lower returns. Secause the economic impact of
migration depends on hioh people move as well as on how many people move,
we believe that these issues are as important as those that have dominated
the literature.
Of course, earlier studies have recognized that migrants ate self-
selected. The development of econometric techniques to account for
selection bias [12] led to several applications of this methodology to the
analysis of migrant earnings. Nakosteen and liner [18] and Robinson and
Tomes [20] report the standard selectivity-corrected earnings functions in
3the mover and stayer samples. These estimates, however, are based on a
conceptual framework which accommodates only one potential destination, and
the studies fail to test for the presence of the equilibrium sorting
predicted by the economic theory of selection.
Within the conceptual framework of the Roy model, we provide an
empirical analysis of internal migration flows using data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Aa shown in Table 1, internal migration is
quite prevalent among these young men and women.2 More than a quarter of
the sample currently (i.e. ,in1986) resides in a state other than the state
of birth, and about 18 percent are living in a different state than at age
14. The data also indicate that roughly 6 percent of the sample moves
across state boundaries in any given year.
Our empirical analysis indicates that interstate differences in the
returns to skills are a major determinant of both the size and skill
composition of internal migration flows. Persons whose skills are most
mismatched with the reward structure offered by their current state of
residence are the persona most likely to leave that state, and these persons
tend to relocate in states which offer higher rewards for their particular
skills. These results suggest that the Roy model provides a useful
framework for analyzing internal migration flows in the United States.
II. Theory
Consider a country partitioned into k distinct geographic regions,
indexed by i—I k. To simplify the exposition, we initially aaswne that
there are no costs of relocating across regions. Individuals compare their
4earnings opportunities in the various regions and move to the location that
maximizes their earnings. We alâo assume that the initial distribution of
individual skills is the same in all regions. At the time of birth,
therefore, individuals are randomly allocated across regions in terms of




where is the mean income that would be observed in region i in the
absence of any internal migration, and v is a random vsriable with mean
zero and variance that measures person-specific deviations from mean
income in region 1.
The assumption that the initial skill distributions are identical
across regions makes the income distributions in (1) independent of initial
conditions: the same earnings generation process applies to all individuals
currently residing in a given region, regardless of where these individuals
were born.3 However, because of regional differences in natural resources,
physical capital, and aggregate economic conditions, mean incomes and the
distributions of the random variables v will vary across regions.
An income-maximizing individual chooses to reside in region j whenever:
log w. >max[logw.] (2)
J
isi
The characteriatics of the sorting generated by (2) cannot be describedwithout additional restrictions on the distribution of the random variables
V1 vk.
A simplifying assumption which allows a complete
characterization of the equilibrium sorting is that individual earnings are
perfectly correlated across regions, so that Corr(vi vj)l for all i.
The population income distribution of region i can then be written as:
log wi — + i—l k (1')
This specification implies that the same random variable v determines
an individual's potential earnings in each of the various regions. Thus, v
indexes an individual's ability or skills, and equation (1') assumes that
the earnings determination process can be characterized by a one-fattor
model of ability. The coefficient q.canbe interpreted as a factor-loading
parameter, or more generally as the "rate of return" to skills in region i.
It is convenient to label the regions such that they are ranked in terms cf
rj with 771<772<.. <77k. We assume that v is a continuous random variable with
mean zero and a range defined over the real number line.
Although the assumption that earnings are perfectly correlated across
regions is quite strong (because it implies that the ranking of individuals
by skill level is the same in all regions) ,itenables us to derive a number
of testable implicstions from a multi-region selection model. Furthermore,
this framework may provide a reasonably accurate representation of earnings
opportunities across regions within the United States, given the relatively
strong regional similarities in economic, legal, and social institutions.
Note that the random variable v need not be observed by the researcher.Individuals sort themselves across regions on the basis of all of their
skills, not just those that happen to be econometrically convenient. By
using a one-factor model of ability, we assume that the relative prices of
all skills ste the same across regions, and so the composite commodity
theorem allows us to focus on a single skill that is being "sold" across
regions. It is possible to analyze the migration decision within the
context of a multi-factor model of ability, but we do not pursue this
generalization because it detracts from the main points that we make in this
paper.
Using equations (1') and (2), region j is preferred to region i
whenever (.-n)v > (p.-p9. This implies that v > (j-p.)/(r.-v.) for j>i,
and that v < (bL-P)/('7-n) for j<i (because hasthe same sign as
j-i). Region j is chosen only if it is preferred to all other regions. As
a result, individuals sort themselves scross regions according to the
following inequalities:
pl-p.
Choose region 1: v < mm—i (3a)
i—2 k 'i 'l
Mi-p.
p. -p.
Choose region j: max < v < mm L! (3b)
(l<j<k) i—I j-l 'j 'i i—j+l k
TMiTMk
Choose region k: v > max (3c)
i—I k-I '7k 7i
So long as the range of v extends far enough, equations (3a) and (3c)imply that some individuals will choose to reside in the "extreme" regions 1
and Ic (i.e., the regions with the lowest and highest values of i').Itis
less apparent, however, that all of the interior regions will be populated.
Depending upon the parameter values, it is possible to have regions for
which equation (3b) is never satisfied, and hence no individuals locate in
these regions.
Because unpopulated regiona are of no interest empirically, we restrict
our attention to regions where some individuals choose to reside, Equation
(Sb) implies that a necessary condition for region j to be inhabited is:
< (4 'j"'j-l'7j÷l'7j




Weassume that equation (5) is satisfied for all regions j (j—2
1). Equation (5) then defines the Existence Condition that mean income in
region j must satisfy in order for region j to attract and retain a
population. This condition greatly simplifies the characterization of the
equilibrium sorting. In particular, repeated use of the Existence Condition
to make pairwise comparisons of the arguments in the min(') and max(')
expressions in (3) yields the following inequalities:
SMi-p2
Choose region 1:v < — (6a)
'2 "i
p. •1-p. ______ Chooseregionj: -Cv< - (Gb)
(l<j<k) qj'i_ 'j
Choose region k: V>- (6c)
'1k '7k-l
Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the equilibrium skill sorting when
there are five regions. The least skilled workers move to the region with
the lowest rste of return to skills, while the most skilled workers choose
the region with the highest rste of return. Persons with intermediate
levels of skills move to intermediate regions, with the more skilled workers
choosing regions with higher rstes of return. In effect, income-maximizing
behavior induces a positive correlation between the average skill lewd of a
region's inhabitants and the region's rate of return to skills:
E(vlchoose i) >E(vlchoosej) if and only if > (7)
The assumption that earnings are perfectly correlated across regions
implies that individuals who rank highly in the income distribution of one
region would also rank highly in the income distribution of any other
region. Skilled workers, therefore, are attracted to high-ti regions because
these workers can then enjoy a more generous return on their superiorskills. In contrsst, unskilled workers choose regions with less income
inequslity becsuse this minimizes the economic penslty for lacking human
capital. In essence, skill prices play an important allocative role in the
internal migration decision.
This insight helps explain the economic content of the Existence
Condition. In order for region j to be inhabited, the inequality in (5)
requires that mean earnings in region j exceed a weighted average of mean
earnings in the "neighboring" regions j-l and j+l. Note that these
neighboring regions need not be geographically adjacent, but are instead
neighbors in en economic sense. Because neighboring regions offer
relatively similar rewards for the skills of potential migrants, these are
the regiona which compete with region j in attracting human capital.
Suppose that mean earnings in region j are below mean earnings in both
neighboring regions. The Existence Condition is not satiafied and no
individuals choose to locate in j .Forsome persona to reside in region
mean earnings in j must exceed mean earnings in either region j-l or region
j÷l, or both. Because these neighboring regions offer either a lower or a
higher rate of return to skills than region j, they hold a natural advantage
over j in attracting residents. In other words, for the same mean earnings,
skilled individuals (v>O) prefer the region with a higher rate of return to
skills, while unskilled individuals (v<O) prefer the region which least
penalizes their lack of skills. Therefore, if mean earnings were equal in
all three of these regions, or if mean earnings in j were lower than mean
earnings in both of the neighboring regions, region j does not make a
competitive offer to potential migrants. In contrast, a sufficiently higher
10mean income in region j than in either of its neighboring regions
compensates potential migrants for region j's relative disadvantage and
attracts a population.
The Existence Condition imposes a specific pattetn of economic
opportunities across populated regions. In effett, the Existence Condition
rules out the case where the relationship between p and ry is U-shaped and
the case where p is constant across regions. Consider any three regions
chat are adjacent in tens of the race of return to skills they offer. All
three regions can be populated if p is monotonically increasing or
decreasing in r, or if p and i are related in an inverted-U shape. However,
if the relationship between p and risflat or U-shaped for any three
neighboring regions, then the middle region would not be able to compete
with its neighbors and would fail to attract any residents.
This discussion suggests an important avenue for future research.
Regions can attract migrants only if they make competitive offers. In a
more general model, the parameters that summarize regional income
distributions are themselves endogenous, and the equilibrium income
dist±ibutions are determined simultaneously with the equilibrium skill
sorting of workers across regions. This general equilibrium model would
also introduce the role played by the prices of fixed factors, such as land.
Although research on this topic is in its infancy (see, for instance, [13)
and [19[), Lt is clear that this type of analysis will provide a much deeper
characterization of spatial equilibrium.
The discussion also highlights a feature of the k-region selection
model that is shared by the standard two-region Roy model. In both models,
11the ranking of skill prices across regiona completely determines where a
region ranks in tens of the average skill level of its inhabitants. As
long as the Existence Condition is satisfied, mean incomes play no role in
determining the skill ranking of regions. Of course, mean incomes do affect
the size and skill composition of the population rhst chooses to reside in
any given region, and in this wsy mesn incomes influence the sversge skill
level of a region's inhabitants. It is obvious from Figure 1, for example,
that a region attracts more residents when its mesn income rises.
Our approach not only raises a number of new substantive issues
regarding the internal migration ptocess, but also simplifies the empirical
analysis of internal migration flows. Earlier work has been hampered by the
fact that there are k(k-l) possible migration flows in a k-region model, and
the size and composition of each of these flows depend on all of the
parameters of the model. Given the Existence Condition, equation (6)
implies that the size and akill composition of the population choosing
region j can be completely determined from the parameters of the income
distributions for that region and the two neighboring regions, greatly
diminishing the number of parameters that influence migration flows into any
given region. In fact, our framework implies that internal migration can be
analyzed using an ordered qualitative choice model.
Our theory also implies that region j can be both a source and a
destination for migrants. As long as skill prices differ across regions,
the spatial missorting of individuals at the time of birth is likely to be
substantial. Skilled individuals, for instance, may be born in low-r7
regions and subsequently move to high-n regions, while less able workers
12move in the opposite direction. Two-way population flows occur naturally as
the mismatches caused by being born in the wrong region are corrected.
The introduction of migration costs does not alter any of the key
results. For concreteness, consider the migrstion decisions of persons born
in region i. Migration to region j (jsi) takes place whenever:
log w. - >max[logwr -Cit]
(8)
where is a time-equivalent measure of the costs of migrating from region
i to region j ,withCO± For simplicity, we assume that migration costs
C are the same for all personscurrently residing in region i.5 Of
course, we do allow migration costs to vary when moving from region i to
different destination regions (i.e., C#C. for r#s).
Assuming initially that every region receivea at least one migrant from
region i (a restriction analogous to the Existence Condition), the
equilibrium sorting of individuals born in region i can be derived:
Choose region 1: v < - (Pa)
'2 l
p. -p.-(C. .-C..) p-p. -(C..-C. .
Chooseregion j: <V < ' i,j+l (9b)
(l<j<k) '1jj-l
Choose region k: v > - (Pc)
'1k '7k-l
13Figure 2 illustrates the sorting of workers born in region three when
there are five regions and it is costly to move. It is spparent that the
equilibrium sorting resembles that obtained when mobility is costless:
skilled workers move to high-,7 regions and unskilled workers move to low-,7
regions. The introduction of migration costs, however, alters the cutoff
points determining who moves to which region. These thresholds now depend
on mean incomes net of migration costs. This fact obviously implies that
fewer persons will leave their region of birth.
A simple perameterization of migration costs reveals exactly whith
interregional flows are most likely to be affected by the fact that internal
migrstion is costly. Suppose that the costs of moving from region i to
region j are C—C for i#J, and 0 otherwise. In this specification,
migration costs are simply the fixed costs of moving that do not depend on
the distance of the move or any other factors which vary with the precise
identities of the origin and destination. From Figure 2, it is clear that
these fixed costs cancel out of all of the cutoff points except those
bordering the region of origin.
Consider an increase in the fixed costs of moving. Obviously, this
increases the fraction of region i residents who decide not to migrate. For
"small" changes in ,thepool of individuals who previously would have
migrated but now decide to remain in i is drawn entirely from those
individuals who would have moved to neighboring regions (i.e., regions with
neighboring values of ij).Thereforesmall changes in fixed migration costs
do not alter the size or skill composition of the outflow to non-neighboring
regions. Put differently, small changes in fixed migration costs only
14change the incentives of "marginal" migrants.
Of course, the larger the increaae in fixed migration costs, the more
likely it is thst no one will move to the neighboring regions i-l and i+l.
Sufficiently high levels of migration costs make it unlikely that all
regions are destinationa for persons originating in region i. Moreover,
those regions which fail to attract migrants from region i are those which
most resemble region i in terms of the payoff to skills.
We noted above that our model generates two-way migration flows without
resorting to imperfect information or informational asymmetries among
participants in the marketplace. The existence of migration costs adds
further substance to this insight. As fixed migration costs increase, fewer
people move to neighboring regions from any region of origin. There is a
tendency, therefore, for persons to migrate to relatively "extreme" regions
(i.e., regions with high or low levels of ,fl.Butthese are precisely the
regions where the costs of being mismatched sre largest, and hence extreme
regions will also be the origin of sirable migration flows. This suggests
that extreme regions simultaneously experience large inflows and outflows of
migrants. Of course, the the magnitude of these flows depends on the exact
distribution of skills, on the levels of fixed and variable migration costs,
and on the parameters of the income distributions in each of the k regions.
It is therefore difficult to quantify the importance of this tendency
without additional restrictions on the model.
III. Empirical Analysis
The theory developed in the previous section generates sharp empirical
15predictions about the relationship between regional differences in the
returns to skills and such diverse factors as the migration propensities of
individuals, the direction and composition of migration flows, and the
spatial distribution of skills. To test these predictions, we analyze the
1979-1986 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
gecause young workers have not yet accumulated agreatdeal of job- and
location-specific human capital and because they have a long working life
remaining over which to collect returns, they should be especially
responsive to economic incentives for migration (recall the high rates of
geographic mobility reported in Table 1)
NLSY respondents are between the ages of 14 and 22 at the time of the
first interview, and the subsequent annual interviews provide a detailed
history of each individual's labor market activity and geographic mobility,
In order to focus exclusively on internal migration, we exclude individuals
born outside the United States or ever observed to reside abroad. In order
to mitigate the impact of extraneous factors on migration flows, we also
exclude individuals who left school after 1984 or who were ever members of
the military.
The NLSY reports each individual's state of residence at age 14 and his
state of residence at the time of each of the eight interviews,6 tecause
tracking geographic location is central to our analysis, we exclude
individuals for whom this information is incomplete. We define as movers
those individuals who reside in a different State in 1986 than at age 14,
regardless of where they lived during the intervening years. Similarly,
non-movers are those who reside in the same State in 1986 as at age 14, even
16if they lived elsewhere in between.
We use state at age 14 as the place of origin for two reasons. First,
this maximizes the sample size because alternative definitions such as state
of residence when the individual first enters the labor market are not
available for those older respondents who had already joined the labor forte
when the survey began in 1979. Second, and more importantly, state of
residence at age 14 is likely to be exogenously determined by parental
location decisions. Alternative definitions introduce endogeneity becauae
the location at the time of labor market entry already reflects the
individual's initial decision as to where he would like to live and work.
Our definition instead exploits the fact that optimal location decisions for
parents and children need not coincide, so spatial mismatches can arise at
age 14. We focus on the subsequent migration decisiona made by young
workers as they attempt to correct these mismatches.
Although SMSAs may better approximate local labor markets, the
preceding considerations led us to adopt states as the geographic unit of
analysis, because the NLSY does not report SMSA of residence at age 14. In
addition, state boundaries are stable over time and create an- exhaustive
partition of the United States, whereas SMSAs do not share these features.
We construct four alternative measures of a worker's skills. The first
messure is the number of years of completed education (as of 1986). The
second measure is based on aptitude test scores. Between July and October
1980, the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was
administered to shout 94 percent of the NLSY respondents. The ASVAB
consists of 10 tests that measure knowledge and skills in areas ranging from
17word knowledge and arithmetic reasoning to mechanical comprehension and
electronics information. The military sums the scores of four of these
tests (word knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, paragraph comprehension, and
half of the score in numeric operations) to create the Armed Forces
Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT is a general measure of aptitude, and
its score is standardized so that the population distribution has mean zero
and a standard deviation of one.
The fins], two measures of worker skills are based on an individual's
average hourly wage, defined as the ratio of annual earnings to annual hours
of work. We exploit the panel aspect of the NLS? to estimate individual-
specific fixed effects. As a result, the wage-based skill measures are
available only for the subsample of workers who have at least two years of
wage data.7 These wage observations need not be in consecutive years.
The wage-based skill measures are constructed as follows, Consider the
earnings function:
log —
$iSTATEt+ 2YEAR + 3Xt + Ejjt (10)
where wi is individual i's hourly wage in state j in year t. The wage is
a function of a vector of dummy variables indicating the current stateof
residence (STATE) ,avector of dummy variables indicating the year of the
observation (YEAR) ,anda vector of control variables (X) .Thecontrol
variables include age, age squared, years of completed education, job
tenure, union status, marital status, health status, metropolitan residence,
industry, and occupation.
18The error term in (10) depends on the state/worker match. Ve assume
that ci_17j(vi+ui). This decomposes the wage residual into rhe product of
the stock of (unobservable) person-specific human capital (v.) and the
state-specific return to human capital (ii)plusa random error term
(nu) .Differencesin the return to human capital across states generate
heteroakedasticity in the earnings function.
Because we have at least two obaeriationa on hourly wage rates for each
individual in the sample, we can compute estimatee of the v.. If all atates
paid the same return to skills, the v. could be estimated by simply adding
peraon-apecific intercepts to the regression. However, because skills are
rewarded differently across statea, we add separate intercepts for each
worker/state pair in the sample. The error specification implies that these
worker/state intercepts are proportional acroaa states (i.e., that is
proportional to 'ii). Note also that the vector of control variables (X)
should include only those characteristics that vary over the sample period.
Differences in earninga due to person-specific factors that are not time-
varying (auch as race and aex) are captured by the v..
The first wage-based measure of worker skills is obtained by estimating
(10) using data differenced from person-apecific means, and then calculating
for each individual his average reaidual (appropriately weighted for state
of residence).8 This procedure yields point eatimates that are identical to
thoae that would reault from adding thouaands of worker/state intercepts to
the regression. This skill measure, which we call the "standardized wage,"
repreaents the number of standard deviations that a worker's hourly wage is
above or below the mean wage for workers with similar demographic
19characteristics.
The second wage-based messure of skills does not control for
demographic characteristics. This "unstsndardized wage" is calculated as
described above, except that the control vector X is omirred from equation
(10) .Theunstsndardized wage measures the number of standard devistions
that a worker's wage is sbove or below the stste sversge, without
controlling for sny observsble fsctors.
Given our ssmple selection criteria, some messure of worker skills is
available for a total of 6666 individuals in the NLSY. However, not all
individuals report esch of the four different skill measures. AFQT scores
are available for 6510 individuals, and only 5182 individuals report the
necessary information to construct standardized and unstandardized wages.
The empirical results presented below are based on the maximum sample size
possible for each skill measure, Virtually identical results were obtained
when the empirical analysis was performed on the subsample of 5064
individusls who reported all four skill measures.
Table 2 presents means and standard deviations of the four skill
measures and selected demographic charsoteristics. The summary statistics
are provided for the entire sample, as well as separately for movers and
non-movers. On average, movers are more skilled than non-movers, regardless
of how skills are measured,
Tsble 3 reveals that, although the four skill measures represent
different aspects of ability, they are highly correlated across individuals.
The top panel presents the matrix of correlation coefficients for chess
variables, and the bottom panel presents partial correlations that first
20control for age, sex and race. The correlations among the skill measures
are uniformly strong and positive, and the correlations ate not appteciably
weaket within age/race/sex groups.
Before proceeding with mote formal statistical teats, Tables 4 and 5
display the patterns of interstate migration that emerge from the NLSY data.
Table 4 describes out-migration from selected states (the 25 states with
the largest sample sizes) .Thefirst column gives the number of persons in
our sample who resided in each state as of age 14, and the second column
reports the frsotion of these "natives" who left the state by 1986. The
remaining columns describe how the skills of movers differ from the skills
of those who remained in the state. In order to facilitate interstate
comparisons, we normalize the mean skill level in each state to be zero.
Thus a weighted average of the skills of movers and stayers equals zero in
each state.
There is substantial interstate variation in the abilities of out-
migrants. For example, Massachusetts exports its most able workers.
Compared to the overall state average, migrants from Massachusetts score
about .4 higher on the AFQT, have completed more than an additional year of
schooling, and command higher wage rates. On the other hand, states such as
Minnesota and West Virginia export young workers who are below-average in
all skill measures.
Table 5 provides a complimentary description of in-migration. The
first oolumn gives the number of persons residing in each state as of 1986,
and the second column reports the fraction of these individuals who lived
elsewhere at age 14. The remaining columns present the average skill levels
21of in-migrants, measured relative to the mean skill level of natives in the
migrant's state of origin.9
As was the case with out-migrants, the data reveal substantial
variation in the skills of in-migrants. For instance, the average person
migrating to Connecticut baa one more year of education than the average
native in the migrant's home atate (as well as higher AFQT scores and wage
ratea) .Thisdoes not neceaaarily mean that Connecticut is importing highly
skilled workers in an absolute sense, but rather that Connecticut attracts
young workers who are more able than the average native in those atatea that
export workera to Connecticut.
The model preaented in Section II implies that the equilibrium sorting
of skills across states ia largely determined by the parameters r. ,the
state-specific returns to skills. In the context of the model, relative
skill prices are proportional to the extent of earnings inequality, and so
we use the standard deviation of the wage distribution within each state to
measure the returns to skills. Because of the small sample sizes for some
states in the NLSY data, we use samples of male, private sector workers from
the 5/100 1980 Census microdata to estimate wage dispersion within each
state.
We construct two measures of wage dispersion. The first is the
standard deviation of the log hourly wage, which we call the
"unstandardized" dispersion in wages. The alternative "standardized"
measure of dispersion is the root mean square error from state-specific log
wage regressions. This measure represents an estimate of the residual wage
variation that remains after controlling for observable demographic
22characteristics. The control variables in these wage regressions include
education, age, age aquared, and dummy variables indicaring marital status,
immigrant status, and metropolitan residence.
The state-specific measure of unstandardized wage dispersion ranges
from .579 (Maine) to .745 (Alaska), wirh a mean of .654 and a standard
deviation of .032. The standardized measure of wage dispersion has a mean
of .339 and a standard deviation of .040. The standardized and
unstandardized measures of wage dispersion are highly correlated across
states, with a correlation coefficient of .895. Southern and western states
tend to display greater wage dispersion than the rest of the country.
According to the self-selection model, migration decisions are
motivated by an initial mismatch between workers and states. The larger the
initial mismatch for a given worker, the more likely he is to leave his
native state. Skilled workers are more likely to leave states where skill
prices are relatively low, even though mean earnings in the state are
sufficiently high to retain other workers. Conversely, unskilled workers
are more likely to leave states where wage dispersion, and hence skill
prices, are relatively high. The theory thus predicts that the correlation
between skill levels and out-migration rates should be more positive in
states with little earnings inequality than in states with a large amount of
dispersion.
To test this implication, we esrimate probit models where the dependent
variable is a dummy identifying those individuals who eventually left their
native state, and the independent variables include a measure of skills as
well as dummy variables for race (white, black, or Mispanic) and sex.
23Separate probita are estimated for each of the four alternative skill
measures. In order to allow the magnitude of the initial mismatch to
influence the probability of out-migration, we segregate the sample
according to state of origin. In particular, we divide the sample into four
approximately equal-sized partitions, with the grouping based on the rank
order of the unstandardized wage dispersion in each individual's native
statej° Through the use of interaction terms, we allow the effect of
skills on out-migration rates to differ according to which state group the
individual resided in at age 14.
Table 6 reports the resulting estimates. For each skill variable in
each of the sample partitions, the table presents the probit coefficient and
the implied effect of a one standard deviation change in skills on the out-
migration rate, computed at sample means. The first column reports these
statistics for the quarter of the sample who, at age 14, resided in states
ranking lowest in unstandardized wage dispersion. The remaining columns
present the same information for individuals originating in states with
progressively more wage dispersion.
The positive coefficients indicate that out-migration rates sre higher
for the more skilled, regardless of the origin state. However, the results
also suggest that this correlation is stronger in states with less wage
dispersion (columns 1 and 2) than in states with more wage dispersion
(columns 3 and 4). For example, a one standard deviation increase in
education raises by about 4.8 percentsge points the probability that a
worker leaves a state from the lowest wage dispersion group, while the same
change in education has s much smaller impact (1.5 percentage points) on the
24out-migration rate of individuals from states in the highest dispersion
group. The same pattern emerges for the other skill measures. Because low
levels of wage dispersion indicate low returns to skills, the results
confitm the theoretical prediction that high ability workers are more likely
to leave states with relatively low skill prices.
The theoretical model also predicts that skilled workers move to states
with greater wage dispersion and unskilled workers move to states with less
wage dispersion. We test this implication by viewing the change in wage
dispersion between the native (age 14) state and the current (1986) state as
a choice variable. For individuals currently residing in their native
state, this change is zero. Among movers, the mean change in the
unstandardized wage dispersion is .012, while the mean change in the
standardized dispersion is .013. Therefore, on average, the young workers
in the NLSY migrate to states with greater wage dispersion. The self-
selection model predicts that changes in wage dispersion should be
positively related to skill levels.
We begin resting this hypothesis by estimating least-squares
regressions of the change in wage dispersion on race and sex dummies and, in
separate regressions, the four alternative meesures of skills. Table 7
presents the estimated coefficients of the skill variables. For
readability, the coefficients have been multiplied by 100. The regressions
reported in the first two columns were run on the entire sample including
non-movers. Regardless of whether the dependent variable is defined using
the unstandardized or standardized measure of wage dispersion, there is a
strong and statistically significant positive relationship between each of
25the skill varisbles and the change in wage dispersion.
The last two columns of Table 7 present similar estimates for the
subsample of movers. The coefficients are uniformly larger than those
obtained from the full sample. Evidently, skills endowments have an
important influence on the direction of internal migration flows. Moreover,
these effects are economically important. For instance, a one standard
deviation increase in schooling raises the change in wage dispersion by
about 25 percent, and a comparable increase in the AFQT score yields an even
larger rise.
An alternative way of investigating patterns of internal migration is
to model the direction but not the magnitude of the change in wage
dispersion. Each migrant has two choices: move to a state with less wage
dispersion than the native state, or move to a state with greater
dispersion. This discrete representation of migration patterns may be
superior to the continuous dependent variable used in Table 7 if our
measures of wage dispersion are plagued by substantial measurement error.
Table 8 presents the results of this alternative specification. Probir
models are estimated on the subsample of movers, with the dependent variable
identifying those workers who moved to states with greater wage dispersion
than their native state. The estimated coefficients confirm the results of
Table 7 in that there is a strong positive relationship between skill levels
and the probability of moving to a state with increased wage dispersion.
The theoretical model also implies that persons locate across states
according to a rank ordering of their abilities. In the absence of mobility
costs, the state with the highest returns to skills attracts the most able
26workers, whereas the state with the second highest returns to skills
attracts workers who are less able than those in the first state but more
able than those in the state with the third highest returns to skills, and
so on. Put differently, ranking states by the average skills of their
residents should produce the same outcome as ranking states by the extent of
wage dispersion. Allowing for mobility costs dampens but does not
fundamentally alter this pattern.
An empirical test of this implication can be conducted by estimsting an
ordered probability model of en individual's state of residence in 1986.
Before doing this, however, it is important to determine whether the initial
distribution of persons across states is random with respect to skills.
Table 9 reports correlation toefficients between skill levels and wage
dispersion in the nstive state. There is a strong negstive correlation
between the average skills of natives and wage dispersion. In other words,
states with more wage dispersion tend to start out with less skilled youth.
If mobility costs are sizable, it is unlikely that migrant self-selection
will offset this initial distribution of skills and yield a positive
relationship between skill levels and wage dispersion in the destination
stste. To control for the nonrandom initial distribution of skills, we
normalize mean skills among natives in each state to be zero. By
construction, these normalized skill measures are uncorrelated with wage
dispersion in the native state (or, for that matter, with any other
characteristic of the native state)
In order to ease the computational burden, we once again divide the
sample into four approximately equal-sized partitions, but this time the
27grouping is based on the rank order of the unstandardized wage dispersion in
each individual's 1986 state of residence.11 The state groups are defined
so that group 1 has the lowest wage dispersion and group 4 has the highest.
In the absence of mobility costs, individuals sort perfectly into these four
groups on the basis of their labor market skills. Let v. represent a latent
variable measuring individual i's skill level. The self-selection model
generates the following equilibrium sorting of workers by skill level:
1 if v. <"1
2 if "1 <vi
<
Choiceof location in 1986 — — — (11)




Ascan be seen from equation (6) in Section II, the cutoff values
and v3 depend on the parameters of the regional earnings distributions.
Let denote an observable proxy for the skills of person i, and let
F. be a vector of race and sex dummy variables. Parameterize each
individual's overall skill level as v_a1Z+o2F+e where e. represents
skills not captured by our skill measures. If unobserved skills are
normally distributed, then the equilibrium sorting is described by an
ordered probit model.12 Maximum likelihood estimation yields estimates ci
a1 and a2 as well as two of the three cutoff values (one of the thresholds
is arbitrarily normalized to zero). The self-selection model predicts that
more skilled workers locate in regions with higher returns to skills, and
this implies that the coefficient ml should be positive.
Table 10 reports the estimation results. The skill measures used in
28the first and third columns are normalized relative to the state of origin
(in order to control for the initial skill distribution), and the
coefficients on these variables are positive and statistically significant.
These results confirm the prediction of the self-selection model. However,
empirical support for the theory disappears when the skill measures are not
normalized, as in the second and fourth columns of Table 10. This reflects
the dominant role played by the initial nonrandom distribution of skills
across states.
TV. Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the internal migration of young workers in the
United States. Our research is motivated by the realization that migrants
are not randomly selected from the population. We therefore adapt the Roy
model of self-selection in order to study internal migration. This approach
generates new theoretical insights, raises questions ignored by previous
research, and simplifies the empirical analysis of multi-directional
migration flows.
The self-selection model provides s framework for simultaneously
analyzing questions related to the size, direction, and skill composition of
internal migration flows. Income-maximizing behavior generates an
equilibrium sorting of skills in which regions offering high rewards for
skills attract skilled workers and unskilled workers move to regions with
low skill prices. Because skilled workers currently residing in regions
with low skill prices and unskilled workers living in regions with high
skill prices are mismatched spatially, these workers are likely to migrate.
29Migrants are expected to relocate in regions where the returns to skills are
more compatible with their skill endowments. Our model extends the earlier
Hicks-Sjaastad framework by emphasizing the role of skill prices in
allocating workers across regions.
Our analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
suggests that the self-selection model provides useful insights into the
internal migration process. Individuals are more likely to migrate the
greater is the mismatch between their skill endowments and the returns paid
to skills in their native state. Moreover, the direction and skill
composition of internal migration flows seem to be guided by comparative
advantage, Skilled workers tend to move to states with greater wage
dispersion than their native state, whereas unskilled workers are more
likely to move to states with less dispersion.
30FOOTNOTES
*This researchwasfunded by the U.S. Department of Labor. Wethank
DanHamermesh for helpful commenta.
1.We do not mean to imply that internal migration research ceased
altogether. A large number of studies have appeared since the mid-1970a
which provide useful extensions of the empirical literature (e.g., [2,7,8]).
2. The sample will be described in greater detail in Section III.
3. This assumption ignores the possibility that persona born in region
i are distinctly different, on average, from persona born in region j ,and
therefore the income distributions should also be subscripted for region of
birth. The main results of our model are unaffected by this complication.
4. If the dollar costs of moving from region i to region j are given
by 0ij' then time-equivalent costs are given by the ratio 0.1w.. We assume
that this ratio is "small" in deriving equation (8)
5. It is not difficult to allow mobility costs to vary across
individuals. In the simpler two-region model with a normal distribution of
skills, it can be shown chat introducing variable mobility costa does not
alter any of the results if earnings and mobility costs are uncorrelated, or
if the variance of mobility costs is small relative to the variance of
earnings.
6.The District of Columbia is considered to be a separate state.
7. In constructing the wage-based skill measures, we restricted the
sample as follows. Observations with computed hourly wage rates of less
than $50 or greater than $100 were considered outliers and excluded. We
also excluded observarions for which any of the following variables were
31missing: industry, occupation, job tenure, health atatua, years of
completed education, school enrollment status, marital status, union status,
and whether the respondent resided in a metropolitan ares.
8. We estimate the parameters in (10), including the v, by a two-step
procedure that corrects for heteroskedasticiry across states. In the first
step, equation (10) is estimated by ordinary least squares and state-
specific estimates of wage dispersion are calculated from the residuals.
The second step uses these estimated variances to reestimate (10) by
generalized least squares.
9. We measure the skills of in-migrants relative to the state of
origin because there exist sizable regional differences in mean AFQT scores,
years of education, and earnings.
10. The partitions are roughly but not exactly the same size because
all individuals from the same native state were grouped into the same
partition. Grouping states according to their standardized (rather than
unstandardized) wage dispersion produces similar empirical results.
11. This contrasts with Table 6, where the grouping was based on wage
dispersion in each individual's native state. The aggregation of states
into four groups insures that adequate samples are observed in each region
and also simplifies estimation of the ordered probit model.
12. For a discussion of ordered response models, see Maddala [16, pp.
46-49]
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'?514TABLE 1
INTERSTATEMIGRATION RATES
NATIONAL LONGITUDINAL SURVEY OF YOUTH
Whites Blacks Hispanics
Males Females Males Females Males Females
% Living in 27.70 32.22 25.86 24.89 20.45 26.7'
Different State
Than at Birth
%Livingin 18.79 23.18 15.11 15.63 12.66 12.67
Different State
Than at Age 14





1979-1980 7.56 7.73 6.95 5.73 3.59 3.76
1980-1981 6.55 7.20 7.79 4.79 4.85 5.67
1981-1982 8.70 6.68 5.88 4.48 4.85 4.16
1982-1983 6.04 7.40 6.00 5.73 3.38 454
1983-1984 5.19 5.77 3.36 4.06 2.95 2.84
1984-1985 5.30 4.82 4.20 4.17 3.38 3.21
1985-1986 6.26 9.25 5.16 5.10 3.38 3.59
Sample Size 1772 2097 834 960 474 529TABLE 2
MEANSOF VARIABLES
(standard deviationsin parentheses)
Overall Sample Movers Non-Movers
Age 24.85 25.13 21.79
(2.23) (2.21) (2.23)
Percent Female 53.80 57.53 52.96
Percent Black 26.91 22.59 27.88
Percent Hispanic 15.05 10.39 16.09
Percent Movers 18.33 100.00 0.00
Length of Time in 5.90 3.27 6.50
Current State (yrs) (2.20) (2.70) (5.59)
Average Real Wage 5.63 5.79 5.59
(1986 dollars) (3.10) (3.24) (3.07)
AFQT Score -0.40 -0.21 -0.44
(0.89) (0.93) (0.66)
Years of Education 12.03 12.36 11.95
(in 1986) (1.98) (2.18) (1.92)
Unstandardized Wage -0.10 -0.06 -0.11
(0.78) (0.79) (0.78)
StandardizedWage -0.19 -0.10 -0.21
(090) (0.89) (0.91)
Sample Size 6666 1222 5444TABLE 3
CORRELATION OF SKILL MEASURES
(asymptoticstandard errors in parentheses)





Unstandardized 0.355 0.307 1.00
Wage (.013) (.013)
Standardized 0.408 0.331 0.820 1.00
Wage (.012) (.012) (.005)
PARTIAL CORRELATIONS OF SKILL MEASURES
CONTROLLINGFOR AGE, SEX, RACE
(asymptoticstandard errors in parenthesea)





Unsrsndardized 0.318 0.289 1.00
Wage (.013) (.013)
Standardized 0.318 0.257 0.940 1.00
Wage (.013) (.013) (.002)
NOTE: Partial correlations are obtained by computing simple correlations
between the residuals from regressions of each skill mesaure on age, sex, and
race variables.TABLE 4
OUT-MIGRATIONRATES AND AVERAGE SKILLS OF OUT-MIGRANTS RELATIVE TO NATIVES IN
THEIR STATEOF ORIGIN, SELECTED STATES
Unstand. Stand.
State N Rate AFQT Education Wage Wage
Alabama 246 .191 0.089 0.071 -.011 -.100
California 661 .097 -.013 -.049 -.116 -.079
Colorado 122 .254 0.120 0.233 -.152 -.006
Connecticut 119 .193 0.180 0.841 0.163 0.145
Florida 240 .204 0.151 -.058 0.020 0.085
Georgia 283 .113 0.264 0.386 0.045 0.474
Illinois 195 .221 0.376 0.678 0.160 0.116
Indiana 118 .271 0.298 1.092 0.250 0.237
Massachusetts 113 .124 0.434 1.303 0.180 0.389
Michigan 318 .255 0.161 0.465 -.007 0.098
Minnesota 148 .223 -.111 -.181 -.205 -.307
Missouri 177 .254 0.074 0.021 -.111 -.040
New Jersey 258 .233 0.370 0.521 0.079 -.112
New York 412 .201 0.122 -.030 0.009 -.038
North Carolina 264 .167 0.159 1.000 -.073 0.167
Ohio 411 .180 0.088 0.207 0.081 0.131
Oklahoma 103 .155 -.245 0.919 -.101 -.209
Pennsylvania 309 .133 0.122 0.670 0.071 0.060
South Carolina 171 .082 0.394 1.091 0.306 0.609
Tennessee 140 .136 -.001 -.062 0.034 0.391
Texas 456 .096 0.307 0.196 0.060 0.023
Virginia 160 .138 0.383 0.675 0.102 0.040
Washington 84 .214 0.234 0.040 -.134 -.139
West Virginia 114 .228 -.212 -.162 -.143 -.172
Wisconsin 256 .125 0.219 0.355 0.114 0.025
ALL STATES 6666 .183 0.144 0.282 0.027 0.062
NOTE: N equals the number of respondents residing in a given state at 14 years
of age. The out-migration rste equals the fraction of reapondents who were
living in a different state in 1986 than they were at age 14. The reported
means of AFQT, education and the standardized and unstandardized wages in this
table are the differences between the mean of each skill variable for out-
migrants and the overall mean of the skill variable for all residents of the
state at age 14.TABLE 5
IN-MIGRATION RATES AND AVERAGE SKILLS OF IN-MIGRANTS RElATIVE TO NATIVES IN
THEIR STATE OF ORIGIN, SELECTED STATES
Unstand. Stand.
State N Rate AFQT Education Wage Wage
Alabama 216 .078 -.014 -.557 0.053 0.289
California 709 .158 0.145 0.385 0.070 0.167
Colorado 135 .326 0.462 0.317 -.038 C.085
Connecticut 112 .143 0.429 1.177 C.467 0.539
Florida 314 .392 0.115 -.165 0.026 0.088
Georgia 309 .188 0.327 0.991 0.316 0.180
Illinois 190 .200 -.095, 0.214 0.026 0.087
Indiana 101 .149 0.103 -.502 0.026 0.128
Massachusetts 108 .083 0.094 0.600 0.247 0.035
Michigan 258 .081 0,212 0.818 0.192 0.169
Minnesota 131 .122 -.001 0.466 0.078 0.236
Missouri 162 .185 0.012 0.282 0.130 0.182
New Jersey 230 .139 -.062 0.335 -.111 -.020
New York 386 .148 0.174 0.696 -.230 -.066
North Carolina 258 .147 0.020 -.216 0.007 -.038
Ohio 366 .079 -.114 -.412 -.477 -.284
Oklahoma 108 .194 0.671 1.157 -.185
-.008
Pennsylvsnia 314 .146 0.157 0.246 -.203 -.089
South Carolina 176 .108 0.418 0.323 0.344 0.272
Tennessee 135 .104 -.048 -1.186 0.511 0.676




Washington 89 .258 0.251 0.343 -.176
-.169
West Virginia 97 .093 0.145 -.073 0.620 0.672
Wisconsin 249 .100 0.302 0.316 -.300 -.008
ALL STATES 6666 .183 0.144 0.282 0.027 0.062
NOTE: N equals the number of respondents residing in a given state in 1986.
The in-migration rate equals the fraction of respondents who were living in a
different state at age 14 than they were in 1986. The reported means of AFO.T,
education and the standardized and unstandardized wages in this table ate the
differences between the mean of each skill variable for in-migrants and the
overall mean of the skill variable for all residents of their state of origtn
(state at sge 14).TABLE 6
THE EFFECT OF SKILLS ON MIGRATION RATES
INMOVER/NON-MOVER PROZIT MODELS
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Unstandardized wage dispersion in
state of residence at age 14:
First Second Third Fourth
Skill Measure Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
AFQT Score .1172 .1874 .0700 .0976
(2.65) (4.80) (1.71) (1.92)
Effect of One S.D. .0283 .0465 .0166 .0234
Changein AFQT on
Migration Rate
Education .0868 .0636 .0090 .0288
(4.55) (3.86) (0.55) (1.33)
Effectof One S.D. .0482 .0347 .0047 .0152
Change in Education
on Migration Rate
Untandardized .1113 .0355 .0114 .0252
Wage (2.16) (0.74) (0.23) (0.40)
Effect of One S.D. .0241 .0075 .0024 .0053
Change in Un. Wage
on Migration Rate
Standardized .0987 .0876 .0181 .0857
Wage (2.18) (2.10) (0.41) (1.62)
Effect of One S.D. .0247 .0218 .0044 .0213
ChangeinSt. Wage
onMigration Rate
NOTE: The probit model also includesrace and sex dummy variables.TABLE 7
THE EFFECT OF SKILLS ON THE CHOICE OF OESTINATIOH
(t-statistics in parentheses)



























































THE EFFECT OF SKILLS ON THE CHOICE OF DESTINATION (FROBIT MODELS)
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variable: Dummy variable indicating whether wage dispersion
increased between state of residence at age 14 and
state of residence in 1986
Movers Only
Change in Change in
Unstandardized Standardized
Skill Measure Dispersion Dispersion








NOTE: These probit models also include race and sex dummy variablesTAELE 9
CORRELATION BETWEEN SKILLS ANDWAGEDISPERSION IN STATE OF ORIGIN














Wage (.0138) (.0138)TABLE 10
THE EQUILIBRIUM SORTING OF SKILLSACROSSSTATES
(asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses)
Dependent Variable: Quartile of state in 1986, where states are ordered by
their wage dispersion
Unstandardized Standardized
Skill Measure Dispersion Dispersion
AFQT score, .1652 . .1464
differenced from (9.62) (8.58)
mean score in
state of origin
AFQT score . - .0922 . - .1127
(-5.48) (-6.69)
Education, .0294 . .0179
differenced from (4.18) (2.61)
mean in state
of origin
Education . - .0209 . - .0124
(-3.09) (-1.80)
Unstandardized .0730 .0638
Wage, differenced (3.67) (3.18)
from mean in state
of origin
Unstandardized . .0409 .0254
Wage (2.07) (1.28)
Standardized .0523 . .0314
Wage, differenced (3.05) (1.82)
from mean in state
of origin
Standardized . - .0281 . - .0827
Wage (-1.67) (-4.90)
NOTE: These coefficients are obtained from ordered probit models that also
include race and sex dummy variables.